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Abstract 
Combinatorial auctions are a promising auction format 
for allocating radio spectrum, as well as other goods. An 
important handicap of combinatorial auctions is  
determining the winner bids among many options, that is, 
solving the winner determination problem (WDP). This 
paper tackles this computational problem using two 
approaches in a combinatorial first-price sealed bid auction. 
The first one, is an A* based on items (BOI). The second 
one, is an A* based on bids (BOB). These two techniques are 
tested in several scenarios for allocating radio spectrum 
licenses. The results obtained reveal that the search 
algorithm A* with the BOB formulation outperforms the 
other  and always finds the optimal solution very quickly.             
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The radio spectrum is a scarce and core resource in 
modern economies. Development of information and 
communication technology (ICT) markets will depend, to a 
great extent, on spectrum allocation policy. Hence, 
governments must assign licenses to use radio frequencies in 
an efficient way, in their search for global welfare. 
Traditionally, tenders have been the most widely-used 
method for allocating the spectrum, although in recent years 
auctions are being used in many countries. When auctions 
are conducted, the determination of the specific auction 
format is a key element in the process. The spectrum 
licenses have a special characteristic to consider before 
choosing the auction format, as the bidder’s value of a 
license may depend on the number of licenses he wins. For 
bidders, licenses might be complements (synergies exist) as 
well as substitutes. In these circumstances, combinatorial or 
package auctions [1] (auctions that allow participants to bid 
both for complete packages of items as well as for individual 
items) are the most appropriate ones. Combinatorial auctions 
have already been used to allocate other goods with similar 
properties such as landing time slots in airports, bus routes, 
freight transportation services, etc. Nevertheless, 
combinatorial auctions have an intrinsic computational 
problem: finding a feasible combination of bids which 
maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue, that is, solving the 
winner determination problem (WDP). Finding the WDP is a 
NP-complete problem [2] and is inapproximable.  
The aim of this work is to build an efficient simulator for 
combinatorial first-price sealed bid auctions. It will be 
applied in several scenarios that can occur in the allocation 
of radio spectrum licenses. According to auctioneer 
decisions about the management of the spectrum, the 
number of licenses to be auctioned and the number of 
bidders can be modified. Hence, the WDP must be solved in 
an appropriate space of time for all scenarios. To this end, 
several search algorithms have been developed and tested. 
Generally, there are two approaches for addressing the 
WDP: optimal and non-optimal algorithms. In this work we 
focus on the optimal approach. The brute-force based 
techniques are able to obtain the optimal solution, but these 
techniques are only practical when the size of the problem 
instance is small. In other cases, heuristic search techniques 
are preferable. First, an A* search branch on items (BOI) 
was implemented, but it was not fast enough. Afterwards, 
another A* based on a branch on bids (BOB) with a more 
efficient heuristic function was successfully developed.       
The WDP has been dealt with by other authors in several 
ways. Some researches have restricted the set of 
combinations for which bidders are allowed to bid on, [3]. 
Others have design approximation algorithms that compute a 
sub-optimal allocation [4]. Nevertheless, these two 
approximations can lead to important economic 
inefficiencies. Hence, most researches have focused on the 
design of heuristic search algorithms, see [5], [6], [7], [8],    
among others. 
The remainder of this article is structured in the following 
manner. The auction model and a detailed explanation of the 
WDP are described in section 2. Section 3 deals with the 
mechanisms implemented for solving the WDP. Section 4 
describes the experimental scenarios tested and evaluates the 
results of the techniques developed for each of them. Finally, 
in section 5, the main conclusions and future work are 
presented. 
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2. The combinatorial first-price sealed bid 
auction and the WDP 
 
The first country in the world to use auctions to allocate 
spectrum was New Zealand in 1989, [9]. In addition, the first 
combinatorial auction to assign spectrum was held in 
Nigeria in 2002, [10]. The Nigerian Communications 
Commission (NCC) adopted a single round, first-price 
sealed bid combinatorial auction format. This same auction 
format has been used by other regulators in other 
countries,such as the Office of Communications (Ofcom) in 
UK. In a combinatorial first-price single round sealed bid 
auction, bidders are allowed to submit in one single round as 
many bids as they wish for any combination of available 
lots. For example, if we are auctioning licenses A, B and C, 
bidders might submit sealed bids for the following 
combinations: A; B; C; AB; BC; AC; ABC. Then, the 
auctioneer determines the combination of feasible bids that 
maximizes his revenues, i.e., solves the WDP. After that, the 
winners have to pay what they bid for the awarded items.   
An important rule to specify in a combinatorial auction is 
that of the bidding language. The most frequent ones are the 
OR and XOR bidding languages. If the OR bidding language 
is used, bidders can win several bids. Nevertheless, the XOR 
bidding language only allows bidders to win one bid. The 
selection of the appropriate bidding language depends on the 
properties of the items being auctioned. If items are 
complements (superadditive values) as well as substitutes 
(subadditive values), just as in the spectrum licenses, the OR 
bidding language is not the best one. For example, if bidder j 
bids according to Table 1, with the OR bidding language he 
can win license A for 5 and license C for 3, so he has to pay 
a total price of 8, although he was only interested in paying 6 
for both of them. In these circumstances, where items exhibit 
substitutability, the OR bidding language does not fit the 
bidders’ values.  Thus, auctioning spectrum licenses, the 
most appropriate language is the XOR bidding language. 
With this bidding language, bidders submit exclusive-or 
(XOR) constraints among all their combinatorial bids, so 
they can only win one bid. This language enables bidders to 
express their preferences. The XOR bidding language is the 
one used in this paper, which was introduced by [2], [11].  
With all the bids submitted, the auctioneer needs to solve 
the WDP, i.e., find a feasible combination of bids that 
maximizes the revenue of the auctioneer. Let M={1, … , m} 
be the set of items to be auctioned and Bj,i={Bj,1, … , Bj,n} the 
set of bids submitted by bidder j. A bid is a tuple Bj,i = (Sj,i, 
pj,i), where Sj,i ⊆ M is a set of items and pj,i the price bidder j 
is willing to pay for that package.  A combination of bids is 
feasible if it allocates no item more than once.  
 
The WDP is a complex optimization problem that 
searches the feasible combination of bids which yields a 
maximum revenue to the auctioneer. Table 2 illustrates an 
example of bids made by three bidders in a combinatorial 
sealed bid auction of licenses A, B and C (for simplicity 
sake the example does not include all possible combinations 
of bids). In this example, there are multiple feasible 
solutions to the problem: {B1,1, B2,1}; {B3,2}; {B1,2, B3,1}; 
{B1,1, B3,1} and {B2,2, B3,1}. Nevertheless, the feasible 
combination of bids that maximize the auctioneer’s revenue 
is {B1,2, B3,1}, with revenue 100€ (80€+20€). As the number 
of bids, bidders and items increases, the problem becomes 
more complex. In fact, this problem is NP-complete and 
inapproximable, so advance computational techniques need 
to be developed in order to solve it. 
To solve the WDP with XOR-constraints we have 
included a dummy item that enforces an exclusive-or 
relation so each bidder can only win one bid, see [7]. In the 
example presented in Table 2, bidder 1 bids would be: B1,1 = 
({A, Z}, 10€) and B1,2 = ({A,C, Z}, 80€), where Z is the 
dummy item that makes both bids mutually exclusive.  
 The sealed bid auction with package (combinatorial) 
bidding is a simple, quick and low cost auction. 
Combinatorial first-price sealed bid auctions are especially 
appropriate when there are asymmetries between bidders. 
Moreover, this auction format prevents collusion among 
participants. Furthermore, in first-price sealed bid auctions, 
bidders tend to shade their bids; that is, they bid less than 
their true value. As bidders’ revenues are calculated as the 
difference between their values and the price paid, they 
need to bid under their value to earn positive profits. The 
degree of shading depends on the number of bidders; as the 
number of competitors increases, it reduces the underbid 
degree, [12].  
 
3. Solving the WDP with BOI and BOB 
algorithms 
 
Solving the WDP is a necessary step for allocating goods, 
    
Table 2. Possible bids with 3 bidders and 3 licenses
Pack
ages 
Bids done by 
Bidder  j=1 Bidder  j=2 Bidder  j=3 
A B1,1=({A},10€) - - 
B - - B3,1= ({B},20€) 
BC - B2,1=({B,C},40€) - 
AC B1,2={A,C},80€) B2,2=({A,C},60€) - 
ABC - - B3,2=({A,B,C},30€) 
For simplification, the example does not include all possible combination 
of licenses.  
Table 1. Example of bidder j personal values for 
complements and substitutes licenses 
Set of items Personal Value 
A   5 
B 10 
C   3 
AB 30 (complementary licenses) 
AC   6 (substitutive licenses) 
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such as spectrum licenses, by means of combinatorial 
auctions. Hence,  developing an appropriate technique to 
work out this complex computation problem within an 
adequate time is required. When tackling the WDP with tree 
search two different types of formulation can be used: BOI 
and BOB [2], [5] and [6]. In this section we present the 
different heuristic search algorithms developed in this work 
to solve this problem for both formulations. 
 
3.1. A* search branching on items (BOI) 
 
The first informed search strategy that we have 
implemented is an A* search based on BOI. The A* 
algorithm is a well known best-first search algorithm which 
determines the least-cost path from a given initial node to 
one goal node. The BOI formulation uses a tree 
representation with the possible combination of items. Here 
each combination of items (a node) is represented with a 
vector of numbers and its length is the number of lots. In this 
vector the position of the digit corresponds to the item, and 
the number inside the vector indicates the bidder. The tree 
has as many child nodes as number of bidders plus one 
branch for zero (which means that a lot has not been 
awarded). A tree of two bidders and two lots (A, B) can be 
seen in Figure 1. The * represents the root of the tree. The 
leaves of the tree walk through all the possible bid 
combinations; for example, leaf 22 is translated to bid AB 
from bidder 2. 
 
 
Figure 1. An example tree in BOI formulation 
 
Each node of the tree contains two important values: one 
is the cost of the bid that it represents, and the other is a 
heuristic value used to estimate if the path is promising or 
not. The cost of the bid is obtained with g(x), which 
calculates the bid, and the heuristic value is calculated with a 
heuristic function called h(x). This admissible heuristic 
function follows two steps: 
1. It searches the combination that yields the maximum 
revenue, given the provisional awarded bids.  
2. It calculates the remaining possible bids for the rest of 
the bidders which have not been awarded yet. 
 
For example, using the bids shown in Table 2, one leaf 
with “10” would represent the bid B1,1= ({A}, 10€). 
Therefore, the value of g(x) for node “10” in that case would 
be 10€. The value of h(x) would be the result of the sum of 
these values: 
1. The maximum bid that the bidder 1 has combined with 
the awarded item, which is B1,2 = ({A,C}, 80€). 
2.  The maximum value for the not awarded items. In this 
example, as item B an C are not awarded yet, the 
maximum value is B2,1 = ({B,C}, 40€). 
 
Finally, the A* algorithm uses the result of the sum of 
g(x) plus h(x) for deciding which is the most convenient path 
to explore (f(x)).  
The problem of this heuristic is the computational time 
needed for calculating remaining possible bids for the rest of 
the bidders, and it get worse when the number of bidders and 
bids grows. This problem is referred to in the literature as 
the that of identifying feasible bids with respect to a given 
partial solution B’ and it has different solutions, such as the 
discrimination of bids into bins (static), or the use of 
counters for the corresponding bids (dynamic). 
 
3.2. A* search branching on bids (BOB) 
 
When working with BOB approaches, several differences 
in representation must be taken into account. Now, as can be 
seen in Figure 2, the nodes represent bids instead of item 
combinations. This tree has been generated starting from the 
example shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. An example tree in BOB formulation 
 
This representation is better than BOI because it allows 
reducing  the search space down to only those bids 
submitted by the bidders. The search space would be the 
Accept Reject 
Accept Reject 
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same for BOI formulations only in the worst case scenario, 
when all participants send all possible combinations of bids.  
However, as can be presumed from  Figure 2, the depth of 
the trees in BOB is usually bigger than in BOI formulations, 
and it always works with binary trees. The depth of the tree 
is not constant and it depends on the bids. Hence, a set of bid 
ordering heuristics that can speed up the search are usually 
considered [5]. The main idea is to construct many high-
revenue allocations early. This measure allows the heuristic 
to avoid exploring unsuccessful paths. Three different 
ordering heuristics have been tested in this research with this 
formulation (all from max to min): 
 
1. Ordering by price, ho(price). 
2. Ordering by number of lots, h1(lots). 
3. Ordering by the mean price per item (mean = 
p/|B|), h2(mean). 
 
As the heuristic function developed for the A*(BOI) is not 
practical with BOB formulation, a new simpler one is 
proposed. First, the value of g(x) is the cost of the bid, and if 
the bid is rejected then the value is zero. Second, the h(x) is 
calculated by adding the higher remaining bids. The main 
difference between the heuristic used in A*(BOI) and this 
one is that the bids chosen with higher values do not need to 
be a feasible solution to the problem. With this measure the 
heuristic function does not need to be constantly calculating 
the compatibility between bids. Instead, a sorted list of 
remaining bids is built for each node. 
 
4. Experimental scenarios and results 
 
In this section, the scenarios tested and the results obtained 
for each of them are presented. 
 
4.1. Experimental scenarios tested 
 
When allocating spectrum, governments must take 
important decisions about spectrum packaging and auction 
design. For example, if an operator needs 24 MHz of 
spectrum (either contiguous or non-contiguous) to provide 
its service, the auctioneer can create one or more packages 
of 24 MHz or design a combinatorial auction that allows the 
bidder to ask for a combination of 3x8 MHz blocks. Then 
the auctioneer can face diverse scenarios for selling the 
spectrum where the number of lots and bidders differs. 
Therefore, the three scenarios described in Table 3 have 
been tested in this work.  
 
 
All the scenarios have been run 100 times in the same 
machine: a dual Intel QuadCore® processor, with 8Gb of 
RAM memory and running Windows® 2003 Server edition. 
In order to avoid bias, all the bidders’ valuations change in 
each execution following a Gaussian distribution between 
two limits. The application has been completely developed 
under .net and it has integration with Microsoft® Excel to 
import and export the results, see Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Application developed to solve the WDP 
However, as measuring the execution time depends on the 
programming and the workload of the machine, we have 
decided to count the number of the search tree explored 
nodes to evaluate the success of the techniques developed. 
 
4.2. Results obtained 
  
With all the bids submitted, the auctioneer needs to 
compute the WDP. Solving the WDP means that the system 
must find the feasible combination of bids which guarantees 
the maximum revenue to the auctioneer. 
The first approach made was the brute-force. It was only 
tested so as to have a point of reference for the incoming 
developments. Afterwards, an A* with BOI formulation was 
implemented. Its results in terms of visited nodes with 
respect to brute-force were obviously improved (see Table 
4). However, the execution time was far from been useful 
for scenarios II and III (7 hours, and more than 48 hours 
respectively). 
 
 
Table 4. Explored nodes for brute-force and 
A* BOI 
Scenario Brute-Force    A* BOI Percentage 
I 3,125 1,555  49.76% 
II 279,936 137,257 49,03% 
III 282,475,249 n/a n/a 
 
Table 3. Experimental scenarios tested 
Scenario Nº of lots Nº of bidders Bids Feasible solutions 
I   5  5 75 3,125
II 12  6 330 279,936
III 10  7 367 282,475,249
In these experiments we have considered that operators are only 
interested in contiguous licenses.     
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Those results encouraged us to improve the system with 
the A* based on BOB formulation and with a more effective 
heuristic. The results of the improvements made by this 
approach can be found in Table 5 and Figure 4. 
 
  
Analyzing the results and attending to the number of 
visited nodes needed to find the solution, the best ordering 
heuristic for the A*(BOB) approach is (in average) the 
h1(lots). However, the results obtained by ho(price) and 
h2(mean) are very similar for scenarios I and II, but when the 
scenario turns complex, the ho(price) improves.  
 
Figure 4. Average explored nodes for each scenario 
and ordering heuristic. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4 the absolute value of explored 
nodes (in average) is remarkably lower for the prices bid 
ordering heuristic in the third scenario (the most complex). 
If we take a look at the time consumption of each technique 
(Figure 5), the ho(price) heuristic visibly outperforms the 
rest. This is because the heuristic function designed for the 
A*(BOB) is based on maximum prices, and the application 
of other types of sorting means more computational effort to 
deal with this task. 
 
Figure 5. Average execution time for each scenario 
and ordering heuristic. 
 
5. Conclusions and future work 
 
This is an introductory work about how to solve the WDP. 
We have successfully developed a system which is capable 
of finding the exact optimal solution for the WDP for XOR 
bidding language in a reasonable execution time (1 second 
for the most difficult scenario). Therefore, this system can be 
used in any combinatorial auction where the WDP needs to 
be solved. 
 
After having developed the brute-force, the A*(BOI) and 
the A*(BOB) approaches, we conclude that the key factors 
for developing an efficient algorithm to solve the WDP are: 
 
1. Determining an appropriate priority of bids. 
2.  Developing an efficient technique for identifying 
feasible bids given a partial solution. (This is 
critical.). 
3.  Implementing techniques for detecting unpromising 
paths as soon as possible. 
 
The results obtained revealed that the heuristic function 
proposed for the A* BOB is simple and very effective. In 
fact, the most complex scenario (III) needs one second on 
average to solve the optimum solution. Thus, in cases when 
not very large instances need to be solved, this can be an 
excellent approach. Nevertheless, if the reader needs more 
performance, the commercial software ILOG® CPLEX 
outperforms most of the existing optimal algorithms for the 
multi-unit case with respect to running time. Only CABOB 
performs comparably well [6], and it is not so easy to 
implement as A*. 
 
As a future work, in order to validate the results, we want 
to make an exhaustive experimentation with instances 
generated with the Combinatorial Auction Test Suite 
(CATS) software, [13]. Furthermore, these tests will allow 
Table 5. Explored nodes reduction for A* BOB 
compared to total number of nodes 
Scenario ho(price)   h1(lots) h2(mean) Average 
I 62,95% 64,42% 63,69% 63,69% 
II 44,56% 51,14% 44,70% 46,80% 
III 99,80% 99,66% 99,61% 99,69% 
Avg 69,10% 71,74% 69,33%  
A reduction of 80% means that only the 20% of the total number of 
nodes (in BOB formulation) are needed to find the optimal solution. 
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us to compare and validate our results with other approaches 
found in the literature and test them with CATS instances.  
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